[b]Proof-of-Screen(POS)[/b]
Proof-of-screenwasatwo-stepprocess.Itdeterminedhoweffectivethescreenwasindetecting
manufacturingflawsandprovedthatthescreenhadnotremovedsignificantlifefromthescreenedproducts.

ScreenEffectiveness
Thescreen’seffectivenesswasmeasuredbyitscapabilitytoprecipitatelatentdefects,suchascomponentweaknesses,PCBflaws,circuittimingproblems,mechanicaltoleranceproblems,solderdefects,andothermanufacturingassembly-relatedissuesassociatedwiththemanufacturer’sorvendor’sprocessgoingoutofcontrol.
Forthisprocess,unitsclassifiedasNTForparametricallymarginalfunctionalunitswouldhavebeenpreferred.
SinceNTFunitswerenotavailable,productionunitswereused.
Twofunctionalproductionunitswereseededwithflawsrepresentativeofthemanufacturingprocessgoingoutofcontrol,suchasapoorsolderprocessordamagedorincorrectcomponentinsertion.Theseededflawsweremicroprocessorpin24bentunderonbothunits,capacitorC618withaleadnickedonbothunits,andacoldsolderjointonathrough-holeleadofcapacitorC303onjustoneunit.
Thescreenshoulddetecttheseflaws.Ifnot,itshouldbemodified(increaseordecreaseseveritylevels)untilitdoes.

InitialScreenResults
Theseededtestunitswerescreenedusingtheprogrammedprofile(Figure2).Thisprofilesubjectedtheunitstotemperaturecyclesfrom+83°Cto-53°Catanaveragetransitionrateof45°Cperminutecombinedwithvibration.Vibrationwasmodulatedfromasetpointof5Grmsto30Grms.Thisinitialscreenproducedthefollowingfailures:
Theunitshadathermalfaultoccurringattemperaturesbelow-40°C,withtheunitlosingserial
communications.ThefailurealsooccurredduringHALT,butwasnotcarefullyanalyzedduringtheroot-causeanalysis.
ThefailurewasthoughttobecausedbyasmallPCBthatwasgoingtobereplacedwitharedesign.However,theresultsduringHASSdevelopmentindicatedthatthesourceofthisfailurewasnotthesmallPCB.Thiswasdeterminedbydisconnectingtheboardandverifyingthatthefailurecontinuedtooccur.Thetruerootcauseofthisfailurewasundeterminedatthistime.
Inunit#1,thebatterychargecircuitwasnotfunctioning,andtheredLEDindicatedbatteryservicewasneeded.Thisoccurredduringtherampfrom-53°Cto+83°Catapproximately-35°Conthesecondcycle.Thishardfailureremainedevenat25°C.
Theunitwasremovedandtestedwithabatteryonthebench.Onpower-up,itblewFETsQ6,Q11,Q22,andQ26,theidenticalfailurethatwasoccurringinthefield.
Uponcompletionofthescreen,avisualinspectionrevealedthattheseededflawC303haddislodgedfromthethrough-holefilletatthecoldsolderjoint.
Asaresultofthesefindings,thedamagedUnit#1wasreplacedwithUnit#3,andasecondscreenwas
performedusingthesameprofile.

SecondScreenResults
ThesamethermalissuesoccurredonUnit#2astheydidduringtheinitialscreenat
-53°C.
TheloadLEDsonUnit#2wereflashingonandoffrandomlyat-53°Cduringthesecondcycle.Thiswasahardfailurethatremainedat25°Cwithnovibration.Avisualinspectionoftheunitrevealedthatametal-oxidevaristor(MOV)componenthadbrokenfreefromtheboard.

ThedamagedUnit#2wasreplacedwithUnit#4,andathirdscreenwasperformedusingaslightlymodifiedprofile.Thisprofilewasprogrammedwithreducedlevels.Thethermallowerlimitwasincreasedto-30°C,andvibrationwasreducedto20Grms.Thisprofilesubjectedtheunitstotemperaturecyclesfrom+83°Cto-30°Catanaveragetransitionrateof45°Cperminutecombinedwithvibration.Vibrationwasmodulatedfromasetpointof5Grmsto20Grms.
ThirdScreenResults
Bothunitspassedthescreenwithnofailuresoranomalies.

ProductLifeValuation
ThisprocessdeterminedthedegreeofappreciableliferemainingintheproductsafterexposuretotheHASS
profile.Theconceptwastorepeattheprofilemanytimes,withoutfailuresoccurring,toshowthatproductionunitsexposedtoonlyonepassoftheprofilewouldstillhave90%minimumoftheusefulliferemaining,or10%maximumofliferemoved.Forgreaterconfidence,additionalrepeatcyclescouldhavebeenperformedontheseunits;however,timedidnotallow.
Production-levelunitswereusedforthisprocess,withbothfixturelocationspopulated.Thetestunitswerescreenedusingthelatestprofile,thenrepeated10times.Thisprofilesubjectedtheunitstotemperaturecycles
from+83°Cto-30°Catanaveragetransitionrateof45°Cperminutecombinedwithvibration.Vibrationwasmodulatedfromasetpointof5Grmsto20Grms.
ProductLifeValuationResults
Aninspectionoftheunitsfollowingcompletionofthe20cycles(oneprofile=twocycles)revealedthattheMOVcomponentRV301hadbrokenfreefromtheboard(bothleadswerebrokenattheboard)ontheupperunit.Thisfailurewasnotconsideredofconsequencebecausethecustomerplanedtouseroom-temperaturevulcanizing(RTV)adhesivetosupporttheMOVonfutureproductionunits.
SummaryTheHASSdevelopmenteffortbeganwithdesigningandqualifyingthefixturebymeasuringtheunit’sthermalandvibrationresponses.Then,theHASSprofilewasdevelopedusingtheunitlimitsdeterminedduringHALT,alongwithotherproduct-specificfactors.Remember,HALTwasrequiredbeforeHASScouldbeproperlyperformed.
DuringthedevelopmentoftheHASSprofile,adjustmentsweremadetotheprofiletooptimizeitsefficiency.
ThesechangeswerereflectedinthefinalprofileshowninFigure3.
Thecoldthermalfaultproblemcausingtheunittoloseserialcommunicationsattemperaturesbelow-40°C
neededmoreevaluationtodeterminetherootcause.Oncedetermined,theprofilewasexpandedandthe
proof-of-screenrerun.ThesamewastrueregardingtheRTVadhesiveontheMOV.TheRTVhadtobeappliedbetweentheMOVandPCBandtheproductlifevaluationrerun.

SuccessfulimplementationofHALTcandramaticallyreduceproductdevelopmentcycletimeandcostswhile
providingtheanswersneededtoproduceamorerobustdesign.SuccessfulimplementationofHASScan
eliminateinfantmortalityfailures,reduceproductsupportcosts,andincreasecustomersatisfaction.
Asuccessfulmanufacturingprogramincludes:
PerformHALTtounderstandandgaininformationoftheproduct’scapabilities.
PerformrootcauseanalysisontheHALTfailuresandimplementcorrectiveaction.
PerformHALTagainwiththenewfixesinplace.
RepeatSteps2and3untiltheproblemsareresolvedsatisfactorily.
PerformHASSdevelopment.
PerformHASSonproductionproducts.
ThemethodofHASSdevelopmentincludes:
Designandbuildafixturethatsupportsthroughputandotherrequirements.
Performfixturequalification.
CreateaHASSprofileofthermalandvibrationstimulibasedontheHALTresults.Inadditiontothese
stresses,applyotherproduct-specificstressesthatwilltestthefunctionalintegrityoftheproduct.
Performaproof-of-screenprocess.
Releasetheprovenprofiletobeginproductionscreening.
MonitortheHASSeffectivenessovertime.
HASSdevelopmentwasnotintendedtobearigidprocesswithanendpoint.Rather,itisalivingprocessthatmayneedmodificationoradjustmentoverthelifeoftheproduct.Asmoreislearnedabouttheproductovertime,includingtheHASSresults,theprofilemaychangeandevolveintoanevenbetter,moreeffectivescreen.

Acknowledgment
IwouldliketoacknowledgeDr.GregHobbsastheinventoroftheHALTandHASStermsandtechniques.
AbouttheAuthor
DavidRahe,directoroftechnicalsupportatQualMark,hasmorethan16yearsofexperienceinthe
environmentaltestindustry.HejoinedQualMarkin1996asthemanagingengineeroftheDenverARTCand
laterservedasdirectorofoperationsforfourwestern-regionARTCs.Mr.RahealsohasheldpositionsofengineeringmanagerandgeneralmanageratTest2.QualMark,AcceleratedReliabilityTestCentersDivision,1329W.121stAve.,Denver,CO80234,(303)254-8800.

GlossaryofTerms
DL—DestructLimit
ESS—EnvironmentalStressScreening
HALT—HighlyAcceleratedLifeTest
HASS—HighlyAcceleratedStressScreen
NTF—NoTroubleFound
LDL—LowerDestructLimit
LOL—LowerOperatingLimit
OL—OperatingLimit
ROC—RateofChange
UDL—UpperDestructLimit
UOL—UpperOperatingLimit